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THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM. By
Richard A. Posner.t Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press. 1985. Pp. xi, 365. $25.00.
Maurice J. Holland2

As its title indicates, this is a book which asserts that the federal courts are in a state of crisis, undertakes to describe and analyze the nature of that crisis, and proposes a variety of remedies by
which the author believes it might be alleviated. It is a work that
deserves wide readership and thoughtful consideration simply because of its many intrinsic merits, and is likely to elicit special interest because Judge Posner has often been mentioned in the media as
among the youngish, conservative, academically oriented jurists
which the present administration has under consideration for future
elevation to the Supreme Court. Should his nomination eventuate,
no Supreme Court nominee since Felix Frankfurter3 will have expressed himself so explicitly and forthrightly concerning the appropriate role and functioning of the federal judiciary as has Judge
Posner in this volume. Although the principal thrust of this work is
an institutional analysis of the explosive growth in the work load of
the federal courts over the past two decades and what is argued to
have been the inadequate, even deleterious responses, there is also
extensive discussion of the author's judicial philosophy, including
his theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation and his
conception of the legislative function of federal courts as formulators of federal common law.
It has for some time been a commonplace assertion, both of
judges and commentators, that the federal courts have experienced
in recent decades a dramatic increase in the number of cases initiated and litigated at all levels, and that this increase has been met
with a disproportionately meager augmentation of resources, primarily the number of judges, with which to cope with the onslaught
of litigation.4 Judge Posner's statistics break little new ground in
I. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
2. Professor and Acting Dean, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
3. f. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928), was in some respects a precursor of the
present work, a lineage acknowledged by Judge Posner in his preface.
4. See. e.g., Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231
(1976): Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary 1979, 65 A.B.A. J. 358 (Mar. 1979); Ed·
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this regard, though he does supply some interesting and informative
refinements based on caseload data supplied by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. Among these are tabulations
and accompanying analyses of the number of cases fully tried as
opposed to simply filed in the district courts in 1983 compared with
the base year 1960 (21,047 compared with 10,003},s the increase
over the same period in the average number of trial days of cases
terminated in the district courts (3.1 compared with 2.2),6 and the
probably greater complexity of cases decided by the courts of appeals. 1 These and other interpolations from the gross data all suggest that focusing simply on the number of cases filed or terminated
considerably understates the magnitude of the caseload crisis.
Where this book does break much new and valuable ground is
in its analyses of the "supply side" in producing the current imbalance between the demand for, and supply of, the resources of the
federal judiciary. In Judge Posner's base year, 1960, there were 322
article III judges, including the Justices of the Supreme Court. By
1983, the number of federal judges had more than doubled, to 657,s
with, of course, no additions at the Supreme Court level. This was
in response to an increase over the same period from 79,200 to
277,031 cases filed in the district courts,9 from 3,765 to 29,580 cases
filed in the courts of appeals,w and from 1,940 to 4,201 cases in
which review was sought in the Supreme Court comparing 1960
with 1982. 11 The least dramatic increase occurred in Supreme
Court decisions on the merits, increasing from 105 cases in 1960 to
196 cases in 1982,12 but this does not reflect the enormously enhanced burden of screening cases for review within its discretionary
jurisdiction.
wards, The Rising Workload and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871 (1983);
Harper, The Breakdown in Federal Appeals, 70 A.B.A. J. 56 (Feb. 1984); and Meador, Federal Judiciary-Inflation. Malfunction. and Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv.
617.
5. R. POSNER, supra, at 68.
6. !d.
7. /d. at 70-73. Judge Posner postulates that the increased proportion of appeals in
which the trial court was reversed in his sample of cases from 1983, in contrast to the 1960
sample, and the greater number of appeals presenting multiple issues in the former year,
equate with greater complexity and hence increased workload.
8. !d. at 27.
9. !d. at 61-64.
10. /d.
II. !d. at 74. Judge Posner used 1982 as the comparison year for the Supreme Court
because complete data were not available to him. The comparable figure for 1983 was 4,155.
98 HARV. L. REV. 311 (1984).
12. PoSNER, supra, at 75. The comparable figure for 1983 was 163. 98 HARV. L. REV.
314 (1984).
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Judge Posner's thesis is that this rise in demand for federal judicial services, combined with the inadequate institutional response
thereto, has resulted in a marked deterioration in the quality of
those services for which the term "crisis" is not an overblown or
hyperbolic description. Somewhat surprising to this reviewer is that
the moderately greater time between initial filings and final dispositions, what Posner calls "the federal court queue," again comparing
1983 with 1960, ranks as the least adverse consequence. Thus, between 1960 and 1983, the average time between filing and disposition after trial in the district courts increased by only 1.2 months,
between noticing appeals and disposition in the courts of appeals by
only 2.8 months, and between filings in the district courts and dispositions in the courts of appeals by only 1.4 months.IJ But the
principal method by which this exemplary timeliness of disposition
has been maintained in the face of bloated dockets is, in Judge Posner's view, at the core of the crisis of deteriorating quality. In his
words:
The principal method of accommodating the caseload increase has been to expand the number of supporting personnel in the federal court. Not only do the
hundreds of federal bankruptcy judges have more powers than their predecessors,
the referees in bankruptcy, but the period since 1960 has seen the creation of a new
and important federal judicial officer called a magistrate, of whom there are now
almost 500 ... operating as a kind of junior district judge. There has also been a big
expansion in the number of law clerks, and the creation of a kind of floating law
clerk called a staff attorney. Many district judges and court of appeals judges now
also use "ex terns," who are law students working as junior law clerks in exchange
for course credit from their law schools; this practice was unknown in 1960.14

Judge Posner does not contend that these ancillary personnel
do not do their assigned tasks well. On the contrary, he gives them
generally high marks for ability and industriousness. The problem
is that they create a degree of distance between the judge, the ultimate decisionmaker, and the judicial product, primarily the opinion, that is inimical to high quality in the latter. "The federal courts
increasingly resemble executive branch and independent agencies,
where a few poorly paid senior officials preside over a bureaucracy
. . . . [T]he specter of bureaucracy increasingly haunts the federal
judiciary." ts
Posner is most worried about the enlarged role as well as the
number of law clerks which he believes has been brought about by
the need to accommodate the vastly increased caseload. 16 Again,
13.

POSNER, supra, at 96.
!d. at 97.
IS. !d. at 39.
16. In 1960, each Supreme Court Justice had two law clerks; court of appeals and district judges one. In 1983, Supreme Court Justices were authorized four law clerks, although
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the problem is not that the clerks are incompetent, or willful, or
that they have been permitted to intrude upon the decisionmaking
authority of their judges, but rather that the pressure of having to
process an ever increasing number of cases has led to delegation to
them of the tasks, not only of researching, but also of writing opinions. The judges have therefore tended to become merely editors of
their opinions, and supervisors and coordinators of the work of
their clerks, secretaries, and staff attorneys. He is concerned that,
despite the best efforts of the judge-editors to whom they are responsible, opinions written by law clerks are likely to be markedly
inferior to those personally authored by judges. In style, they tend
to be "colorless and plethoric, and also heavily given to euphemism."n "Instead of using language to highlight the things being
discussed, the standard [law clerk] style draws a veil over reality,
making it harder to see exactly what the judge is doing."Is Clerks
are inclined to write opinions that are prolix, riddled with banalities, platitudinous, and burdened with excessive footnotes and citations. Worst of all, in Judge Posner's view, they lack candor and
straightforwardness; hence their value as sources of authority for
lawyers and other judges is greatly depreciated. "To write novels
and to edit novels written by others are on different planes of creativity, and I think there is a similar difference in judicial creativity
between writing one's own opinions and reviewing opinions written
by one's law clerks." I9
The parlous effects of the aggrandizement of the law clerks are
not limited to depreciation in the quality of the work product of the
federal courts. They also have the incidental but important consequence of reducing the job satisfaction and attractiveness of being a
federal judge:
It is a curious feature of the American legal system that a handful of famous
judges should have made a contribution to the law so greatly disproportionate to
their number. But it is true; and it would be sad to think there will never be another
great American judge. Yet one wonders whether an editor can be a great judge. It
is not just a failure of imagination ... that makes me unable to visualize Oliver
Wende!! Holmes coordinating a team of law clerks and secretaries and polishing the
drafts that the clerks submitted to him. The sense of style that is inseparable from
the idea of a great judge in our tradition is unlikely to develop in a judge who does
not do his own writing.20

At a time when the relative paltriness of federal judicial salaJustices Rehnquist and Stevens employ only three and two, respectively. Court of appeals
judges are authorized three, and district judges two law clerks. !d. at I02-04.
17. !d. at 107.
18. /d. at 108.
19. /d. at Ill.
20. /d.
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ries is thought to be driving many of the best judges off the bench,
and discouraging many of the best suited lawyers from accepting
appointment, any deterioration in the intellectual and professional
gratifications of the position is especially unfortunate.
An obvious solution to the crisis would be simply to appoint
more federal judges. But Judge Posner believes that any substantial
increase in the number of court of appeals judges could not be accomplished without risking the present generally very high quality
which now prevails. For every one of the 648 lower court federal
judges presently sitting, there might well be among the American
bar four or five potential and theoretically available recruits whose
appointment would not degrade in the slightest the aggregate quality of the federal judicial corps, leaving judicial inexperience out of
account. (This is the reviewer's highly impressionistic guess, not
Judge Posner's.) But a very large segment of this potential appointee pool is not realistically available, because of unwillingness
to accept lower salaries or other working conditions of a federal
judgeship, political or ideological incompatibility with an incumbent President, inability to meet the admittedly inconsistently applied special requirement of extensive trial experience for a
favorable rating from the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Judiciary,21 or simply lack of interest in judicial work.
Even if these impediments could be surmounted to the point
where a greater portion of professionally qualified lawyers could be
tapped, Judge Posner does not believe that much of the solution to
the crisis of the federal courts lies in the creation of additional
judgeships. This is primarily because of the acutely pyramidal
structure of the federal judiciary, and the practical obstacles in the
way of increasing the capacity of the tribunal at the apex of the
pyramid, the Supreme Court, by augmenting its membership or by
any other feasible means. Any diminution in the opinionwriting
burden per Justice that might be achieved by adding, say, two new
Justices, would almost certainly be offset by the aggravated difficulties of forging majorities among a larger group of people. A somewhat similar objection can be raised against either increasing the
number of judicial circuits, which would breed a larger number of
intercircuit conflicts, or enlarging the number of judges assigned to
21. Judge Posner ventures an interesting explanation for the Committee's strong emphasis on trial experience, with which he disagrees. By requiring recent and substantial trial
experience, particularly for district court appointments, the ABA can pronounce political
hacks unqualified on the basis of an objective criterion, whose application is not subject to
dispute like a subjective standard such as general legal ability. /d. at 30 n.9. The Committee
has sensibly been willing to dispense with this requirement in cases where it has other assurance of professional qualification, as in the author's own instance.
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the most heavily burdened circuits, which, by increasing the potential for intracircuit conflicts among panels, would heighten the need
for cumbersome and time-consuming en bane hearings of cases.
Judge Posner concedes that these difficulties have little application
at the district court level, but it is at this level, he believes, that the
crisis is least acute, primarily because district judges do not, for the
most part, function collegially, and because they play a decidedly
subordinate role in the lawmaking as opposed to law application
and factfinding. In any event, the obstacle to the creation of any
significant number of new district judgeships might well be of a different sort; that is, the pool of potential appointees as well fitted for
the special and extraordinary demands of this position as the average of the existing corps of federal trial judges is possibly relatively
much smaller than is the case with potential appointees to the
courts of appeals.
If appointment of additional judges does not commend itself as
a solution, what remedies does Judge Posner propose? In fact, he
considers a broad array of them, some grouped under the heading
of "palliatives," and others that he regards as more thoroughgoing
and systemic. Among the former are: "raising the price of access
to the federal courts; limiting or abolishing the diversity jurisdiction; moving toward a system of specialized federal appellate courts;
reforming administrative review; and creating a kind of junior
Supreme Court to assist the Supreme Court in assuring a reasonable
uniformity of federal decisional law."22
Judge Posner concedes that some of the costs of litigation are
rightfully subsidized by taxpayers to reflect the externalized benefits, primarily the clarification and elaboration of the law, to society
at large, but thinks that the subsidy available to "users" of the federal courts has become excessive, to the point where many cases
that should be handled in state courts are dysfunctionally attracted
into the federal system. He therefore proposes that the fees for filing or removing civil cases involving nonindigent parties to federal
court be substantially increased from the present basic fee of $60 to
roughly $1,000. 23 He also favors broader use of the device of twoway shifting of attorneys' fees to deter fruitless litigation by overly
optimistic plaintiffs or defendants.24
Judge Posner joins ranks with such well-known advocates of
curtailing the beleaguered diversity jurisdiction as Chief Justice
Warren Burger and Judges Henry Friendly and Clement Hayns22.
23.
24.

!d. at 130-31.
!d. at 133.
!d. at 137-38.
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worth. He points out that, even on the extremely doubtful assumption that the putative original rationale for this anomalous category
of jurisdiction, the supposed bias of local juries against out-of-state
litigants, retains any contemporary validity, it makes no sense to
permit home-state plaintiffs to invoke it against out-of-state defendants.zs He would have Congress disallow this, and overcomes his
general skepticism about the utility of amount-in-controversy requirements to the point of urging that the present $10,000 amount
be raised to at least $50,000, which would be just a bit more than an
adjustment for inflation since 1958, when the former amount was
set.
Judge Posner considers, but for the most part rejects, the idea
of creating new federal appellate courts of nationwide jurisdiction
and specialized subject-matter competency much beyond the recently created Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.26 He does
so out of concern that, if so much paramountcy in such areas as
federal antitrust or criminal law were concentrated in a single court
having a near monopoly of appellate authority in its assigned field,
albeit subject to occasional review by the Supreme Court, the struggle to secure control of its composition would be exacerbated to an
unwholesome degree. Another objection he sees is that this would
deprive the Supreme Court of the benefit of review against the helpful background of multiple and diverse resolutions of emerging and
difficult issues by the generalist courts of appeals.
Another "palliative" advanced by Judge Posner with greater
enthusiasm is that the quality and thoroughness of appellate review
within the federal administrative agencies be improved:
With the appellate process within the agencies strengthened, the scope of federal [judicial] review of administrative decisions could be reduced. In the case of
social security disability benefits, maybe it could be eliminated altogether; and certainly there would be no need for the two tiers of judicial review that we now
have-review in the district court with a right of appeal to the court of appeals.27

Requiring, and providing the necessary resources for, well-reasoned opinions within the agency structure might well deter some of
the appeals that are now taken to the courts from administrative
adjudications. A more thoroughly developed record, including
such an opinion, would in any event facilitate the work of the judges
in cases that did reach them.
25. !d. at 146.
26. Created in 1983, this new court assumed the jurisdiction previously vested in the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appeJlate division of the Court of Claims. See
28 u.s.c. § 1295.
27. POSNER, supra, at 161.
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The proposal, which has been bruited around for more than a
decade, to reduce the workload of the Supreme Court by creating a
new federal court with nationwide jurisdiction and having the sole
task of resolving conflicts among the circuits, has little appeal for
Judge Posner. He is unpersuaded that the Supreme Court is in fact
overburdened by cases presenting intercircuit conflicts, or that
prompter or more pervasive resolution of such conflicts would be
sound judicial policy.zs If the courts of appeals are generating more
conflicts among themselves than might be desirable, he proposes
that they consider a self-imposed, and presumably informal, policy
of deference whereby, if the first three circuits to consider a given
issue agreed upon its resolution, then all courts of appeals before
whom the same issue subsequently arose would follow suit. Judge
Posner also sees problems with the most frequently proposed
method of manning this "junior Supreme Court"-random selection of members from among sitting court of appeals judges, which
would drain off resources from the very courts where the crisis is
perceived by him as most pressing.
To this writer, the most interesting portion of The Federal
Courts consists of those chapters wherein Judge Posner moves beyond procedural adjustments and matters of institutional design of
the sort just summarized, his "palliatives," and turns to development of themes which penetrate to the core and substance of federal
jurisdiction, and even to the nature of adjudication and the craft of
appellate judging in the most fundamental terms. To the hasty
reader, the author's excursions into the realms of legal process and
applied jurisprudence may seem at first blush to be somewhat gratuitous interpolations which ill consort with the book's central preoccupation with matters of institutional structure. That reaction
would be a mistake. For Judge Posner's unifying premise is that the
judiciary's essential task of rendering judgment must be kept constantly in mind as one appraises malfunctions in the system.
Few would deny that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts should be substantially contracted. Posner goes further, arguing that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the inferior federal
courts that is keyed to enforcement of rights and liabilities arising
under federal substantive law has become considerably more extensive than warranted by any tenable concept deducible from the constitutional empowerment of Congress to establish and deploy such
courts in complete or partial derogation of the residual general jurisdiction of state courts. His model for what he calls the "optimal
28.

!d. at 163.
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scope of federal jurisdiction"29 is erected upon the postulate that
not all cases arising under federal law should be assigned to the
exclusive, or even the concurrent, jurisdiction of the inferior federal
courts, but rather only that subcategory of such cases which call for
the special measure of independence from political influences afforded federal judges by article III of the Constitution, an independence greater than that typically enjoyed by their state
counterparts. Federal question cases falling outside this subcategory can, in his opinion, be prudently and more efficiently left to
the general jurisdiction of state courts, subject of course to Supreme
Court review.
Since state court judges can be expected to be less independent of state political
forces than federal judges when both are residents of a state adversely affected by
federal regulation, a state court may be an unsympathetic tribunal in a case where a
federal right has been created in order to correct an interstate externality. 3D

In other words, only when a federally created right or regulatory scheme is intended to require each state to bear some cost or
burden (i.e., internalized) which, left to its own preferences or in the
hands of its own judges, it might be tempted to cast off upon other
states or the nation as a whole (i.e., externalize), is there a compelling case made out for jurisdiction in the lower federal courts. The
concept of externalities is, of course, a fundamental element of economic cost-benefit analysis, and has its most obvious applications in
contexts posing conflicts of palpably economic interests. Among
the states an obvious example is the problem of regulating interstate
pollution. State court judges, out of their supposed greater susceptibility to parochial influences, might be marginally more prone than
federal judges to give an erroneously stringent or lenient interpretation and application of federal statutes addressed to this problem,
depending upon whether they reside in a state which is the victim or
the source of interstate pollution.
Judge Posner's examples of federal statutes regulating economic activity, but not substantially concerned with adjustment of
interstate externalities, are the federal Truth-in-Lending statute, the
odometer-tampering statute, and the federal securities acts as applied to small, local corporations. These have in common the characteristic that the benefits and costs of enforcement are both likely
to fall within the same state, and are therefore unlikely to pose any
temptation to externalize costs. Much the same is true of some federal question cases which are more compensatory than regulatory in
29.
30.

/d. at 175.
/d.
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purpose, such as those brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
Posner expands the reach of his externalities model to include
categories of federal jurisdiction which are not concerned with economic interests in the strict sense of the term. Thus, in the contexts
of habeas corpus and civil rights claims, he analogizes claims or
claimants invoking federal law likely to be unpopular or disfavored
by local influences within a state to those which impose material
costs or burdens with no offsetting benefits. For example, he does
not believe that state judges are any less concerned than federal
judges to avoid convictions of innocent criminal defendants, and so
would restrict the scope of federal habeas corpus to claims that state
courts have erroneously rejected a federal constitutional rule intended to deter police or prosecutorial misconduct in contrast to a
rule intended to assure the reliability of guilty verdicts.3I He
reaches a similar conclusion with respect to such federal civil rights
claims as asserted violations of the Age Discrimination Act and
public employee claims of discharge in violation of due process,
which he believes are not likely to be unsympathetically handled by
state judges, because they are not locally unpopular.
The author concedes that, when all of these federal law claims
have been sorted out and allocated or reallocated according to his
broadly conceived externalities criterion, the attendant reduction in
the federal courts' caseload would still be quite modest. He estimates it at twenty percent in the district courts and twenty-one percent in the courts of appeals.32 But when this is combined with the
significant contraction of the diversity jurisdiction he also advocates,33 the total reduction is by no means inconsequential.
The overextension of the federal question jurisdiction has resulted, in Judge Posner's view, not only from its unnecessarily enlarged formal delineation, but also from an extravagant
proliferation of the substantive claims to which this jurisdictional
category applies, a proliferation derived from dubious interpretations of the Constitution and, to a lesser extent, Acts of Congress.
He is in emphatic disagreement with the dominant, contemporary
"noninterpretist" approach to constitutional interpretation, under
whose auspices a plethora of recently discovered rights have been
established. He is, however, no thoroughgoing "originalist," and is
willing to countenance recognition of evolving constitutional norms
31.
32.
33.

/d. at 186-87.
!d. at 189.
/d. at 146.
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not traceable to the intent of the framers. Posner's constitutional
philosophy is expressed in these paragraphs:
The Civil War taught a Jesson about the instrument the framers had
drafted, ... that they had made a mistake in putting the social institutions of the
states almost completely beyond the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The
Civil War showed that there cannot be an American nation if the states are totally
free to go their own way in the matter of social arrangements. Some minimum
homogeneity of social institutions is necessary if people are to consider themselves
American first and Georgians or New Yorkers second .
. . . I shall assume that [the fourteenth amendment] was intended to give the
Supreme Court broad discretion to invalidate state laws, and having made that assumption shall ask how the discretion should be guided. . . .
The usual answer to the question of how to guide judicial discretion in interpreting open-ended constitutional provisions, including the due process clause, is
summed up in the words "natural law."
I offer in a speculative spirit the following alternative to natural law ... a Jaw
that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property in violation of a fundamental
social norm held by most of the nation denies due process. If Indiana adopted the
Islamic code of punishment, or Florida authorized torture in police interrogation,
or New Mexico decided to censor its newspapers, or California abolished the right
to trial for crimes, these states would be violating the due process clause.
Notice that I am using as my index of consensus state legislation. I am not
suggesting that the content of the due process clause should change with the latest
public opinion polls.
Obviously my view is incompatible with the idea that the due process clause
"incorporated" any provision of the Bill of Rights in toto. . . . The Bill of Rights
was intended to weaken the federal government; apply the Bill of Rights to the
states ... and you weaken the states tremendously by handing over control of large
areas of public policy to the federal judges, whose interpretations of the Bill of
Rights are (short of constitutional amendment) conclusive of its meaning .
. . . This anchor limits the subjective, ad hoc character of the concept; the judge
is not free to set his personal views against the views embodied in the public policy
of a majority of the states.
It is a necessary condition of unconstitutionality under this approach that the
challenged state practice be followed in only a minority of the states. But it is not a
sufficient condition. The goal is not to stifle experimentation but to prevent deviations from the national consensus that are so extreme, so shocking, that they
threaten national unity. 34

It would be difficult to find a more constrained conception of
due process than this. It is hard to imagine a Supreme Court
guided by Judge Posner's standard exercising much meaningful
control over the states. However well or ill considered are his examples of state laws violative of due process, it is entirely clear that
he considers a posture of very nearly total deference to be the appropriate one. This is judicial restraint for those who like it neat,
envisioning as it does a more limited role for federal courts in en34.

!d. at 192-95 (footnotes omitted).
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forcing constitutional norms against the states than all but the most
literal minded of originalists. Of course this discussion relates only
to the due process clause as a substantive limitation of state legislative power, and perhaps this stringent standard of judicial review is
not intended by Judge Posner to apply pari passu to the equal protection clause or to constitutional limitations against the power of
the federal government. This is not a book primarily about constitutional law, and he does not single out these matters for separate
extended elaboration. To the extent that considerations peculiar to
federalism inform this highly restrictive formulation, it is a fair inference that Judge Posner would vouchsafe a considerably more interventionist role to the federal courts vis-a-vis the federal
government.
At another point in the book, Posner sums up his general theory of constitutional interpretation:
I am speaking only of cases in which the meaning of the Constitution is unclear. I do not mean to place the minority at the mercy of the majority; that would
deny the very concept of a constitutional right. . . . But if a court cannot honestly
determine whether such a right exists then it should be denied; doubts should be
resolved against the claimant. . . . [I]t is the counsel of prudence for courts to yield
to the dominant power when to do so does not deny a clear constitutional right.
When in doubt, the democratic principle, reinforced by concern for maintaining the
courts' political capital, should lead the courts to interpret governmental powers
broadly, and rights against government narrowly.35

What a wide world of disputation lies embedded in that short
modifier "clear"! Few even of our most activist judges would avow
disagreement with this formulation, however discrepant might be
their practice. For Judge Posner, "clear" constitutional rights, at
least against the states, are rights not to be deprived of life, liberty,
or property other than in accord with practices well established in
any respectable minority of the states. This standard would tilt judicial review toward the preservation of traditional, customary
norms and practices, and make of it a conservative rather than a
reformist force, retarding rather than fostering change on those few
occasions when it is exerted at all. It harkens back to the venerable
conception of due process articulated by Justice Cardozo in his famous opinion in Palko v. Connecticut,36 and by such constitutional
scholars as James Bradley Thayer37 and Edward S. Corwin3s in an
earlier era. It is also more faithful to the logic of Marbury v.
35. /d. at 273-74.
36. 302 u.s. 319 (1937).
37. See generally Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
38. See generally Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911).
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Madison,39 with its emphasis upon reserving the power of invalidation only for cases of nearly literal repugnancy between the Constitution and the challenged statute, than is the dominant practice of
recent decades.
Judge Posner believes that the crisis of the federal courts has
been exacerbated by some shortcomings of modern judicial technique. One such shortcoming, the prevalence of unduly lengthy
opinions, larded with unhelpful string citations and prolific footnotes, has already been mentioned. 40 Another is the proliferation of
concurring opinions which add little but bulk to the federal reporters and grist for the mills of law clerks eager to display their learning in the best (or worst) law review style. He is also trenchantly
critical of dissenting opinions which are principally concerned with
impugning the intellectual integrity of the majority:
To put it bluntly, many contemporary federal appellate opinions seem to be
self-indulgent displays performed with little concern for ... the audience . . . . A
self-indulgent opinion is ... much longer than it need be ... , the author having
made no effort to prune it of facts, procedural history, and citations that are unnecessary to an understanding of the decision. . . . [I]t is also irresponsible; it subordinates the judge's institutional obligations to his delight in self-expression, or more
mundanely to his reluctance ... to curb the self-expressive ardors of his law clerks.
. . . There are opinions that, once the boilerplate of procedural details, supernumerary facts, and redundant or inapposite citations is stripped away, are actually
too short; the analysis is missing.
Another and increasingly common manifestation of excessive judicial self-assertion is the abuse-often shrill, sometimes nasty-of one's colleagues. Nothing is
less helpful, less convincing, or less edifying to the professional readers of judicial
opinions ... than denunciations of a disagreeing colleague.41

Judge Posner does not essay any explanation of the root causes
of what he describes as "a deficient spirit of institutional responsibility,"42 beyond the multiplication of the law clerks, which he describes as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of this
indiscipline. (My own decidedly idiosyncratic explanation for most
of our current ills, including judicial "logorrhea," is that it is due to
the decline in the study of classical languages!)
Judge Posner also criticizes the failure, in so many cases, of the
courts of appeals to write any generally published opinion at all, a
direct and particularly lamentable consequence of the caseload
explosion:
The federal courts of appeals have adapted to the caseload explosion in part by
39.
40.
41.
42.

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
See supra notes 18-20.
PosNER. supra, at 230-32 (footnotes omitted).
/d. at 241.
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reducing the quality of their output. This is an inevitable cost of the commitment to
accommodate all increases in the demand for federal judicial services without raising the direct or indirect price of those services . . . . If the caseload continues to
grow in the years ahead, the quality of the federal courts will continue to decline
unless major changes are made in the system.43

Judge Posner makes a convincing point about another phenomenon that might in part fall under the heading of judicial technique, and which seems to this reviewer to bear even greater
emphasis than he gives it. That is the strong attraction which multifaceted standards seems to hold for contemporary judges, in lieu
of the more definite legal rules they have tended to displace. As he
puts it:
The choice between rule and standard has profound institutional implications.
Because a rule is more definite, the adoption of a rule will increase legal certainty
and thereby reduce the amount of litigation; it will also make each lawsuit simpler
and shorter . . . . [G]enerally rules reduce and standards increase the amount as
well as the length of litigation, and in a time of acute caseload pressures these consequences make rules attractive. Yet courts seem to shy away from declaring definite
rules. They prefer to avoid definite decision by announcing a vague standard or,
what amounts to the same thing, a multifactored test with equal weighting of each
factor, leaving to the indefinite future the resolution of the uncertainties implicit in
such an approach.44

The Federal Courts is a book that will alarm, even infuriate,
some readers, partly because of the author's rigorously positivist
theory of constitutional interpretation, and partly because many
people react with suspicion verging on paranoia to any suggestion
that the jurisdiction of federal courts be contracted or access to
them made more difficult. However, much of what Judge Posner
has here written is not linked to any sort of ideological commitment, but rather consists of cold-eyed, carefully considered analysis
of the institutional and operational function of the federal courts.
Few are likely to come away from reading this work unconvinced
that these courts do in fact face a crisis, and that all indications are
that the crisis will progress to a condition of near disablement unless some remedies are soon devised and urgently implemented.
Many of the remedies Judge Posner proposes strike this reviewer as
self-evidently sound and urgently called for. Others are clearly
more problematic, but this surely does nothing to detract from the
ongoing discussion, both within and without the profession, to
which his book is a notable contribution.

43.
44.

/d. at 124.
/d. at 245.

